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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LARRY N. HEATH,
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Case No.
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vs.
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BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from the judgment of the Second District Court
for Davis County, Honorable J. Duffy Palmer presiding.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LARRY N. HEATH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No.
15569

vs.
SAM L. GALLEGOS,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant, Sam L. Gallegos, appeals the Court
decision that Respondent had no contributory or comparative
negligence in the automobile accident between the two.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Honorable J. Duffy Palmer, sitting without
a jury, found that the Appellant was solely negligent in
causing the automobile accident between he and the
Respondent.

The Court found the Respondent to be without

any contributory or comparative negligence and awarded
damages to the Respondent, dismissing Appellant's counterclaim.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant, Sam L. Gallegos, requests this Court
to set aside the findings of the trial court that the
Respondent was without contributory or comparative
negligence and adjust damages awarded accordingly.
STATE11ENT OF FACTS
The Respondent was traveling west on a road
known as 17SO North in Layton, Davis County, State of
utah.

(T-4)

This was a twenty-five mile per hour zone.

(T-8)
The Respondent testified that he was traveling
about fifteen to twenty miles per hour just prior to the
accident.

(T-29)

He stated that he heard the Appellant

honk once and he looked up to see what was

happenin~.

He

heard the horn again and looked in his rearview mirror and
saw the Appellant extremely close to him so he stopped.
(T-30)
The Respondent admitted that the Appellant ·,.;as
too close to the rear of his vehicle for
they were traveling,

~he

(T-43), yet he stopped

normal lane of traffic.

(T-45)

speed that
ri~ht

in his

The Appellant ran into

the rear of him.
The Appellant stated that the

Respo~de~t ~as
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traveling between five and ten miles per hour and as he
pulled in behind the Respondent, he honked twice to get
him moving faster.

(T-58)

The Appellant stated that

the Respondent then slammed on his brakes causing the
(T-59)

collision.

The Layton City police officer who investigated
the accident testified that the Respondent told him the
Appellant got so close behind that he put on his brakes
and stopped.

(T-8)

The police officer stated that both

cars were in the normal traveled portion of the road for
westbound traffic.

(T-10)

The officer stated in his

police report that the Respondent's vehicle stopped
(T-12)

rapidly.

The police officer could not remember

why he drew this conclusion, but was of the impression
that the nature of the Respondent's stop was something
more severe than an individual who was approaching an
intersection and stopping.

(T-13)

The police officer detected that there was an
unusual amount of hostility between the parties.

(T-9)

The Respondent admitted that he knew it was the Appellant
in the vehicle behind him at the time he stopped.

(T-48)

ARGUMENT
THE COURT ERRORED IN HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENT WAS FREE
OF ANY NEGLIGENCE WHICH PROXIMATELY CONTRIBUTED TO THE
ACCIDE~T.
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The transcript shows that there had been prior
contact and resulting hostilities between the Appellant
and Respondent before the date of the accident.

(T-45 to 50)

The Appellant is a Mexican and the Respondent is Black.
Their respective ethnic backgrounds were obvsiously the
subject of much of their discussion after this accident
occurred.

It is submitted that the Appellant knowingly

pulled up behind the Respondent and honked, apparently as
a sarcastic response to Respondent's slow speed.

The

Respondent, knowing who was in the vehicle behind him and
as his means of retaliation, suddenly applied his brakes.
As a result of the Appellant being too close and the
Respondent suddenly stopping, there was a collision.
Whether this is a correct interpretation of the motives
involved, it is evident that the Court errored in failing
to find that the Respondent negligently contributed to the
accident.
Utah Code Annotated, 41-6-69

(c)

states:

No person shall stop or suddenly
decrease the speed of a vehicle
without first giving an appropriate
signal in the manner provided herein
to the driver of any vehicle
immediately to the rear when there
is an opportunity to give such signal.
The question as to the type of signal required
to adequately notify the vehicle in the rear has been
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interpreted to be dependant upon the circumstances.
It has been held that the brake lights may
constitute sufficient warning if the stopping of the front
vehicle occurs in a reasonably anticipated manner or in
connection with other road requirements.

See Flippen v.

Millward, 234 P. 2d 1053 (1951) and United States v.
First Security Bank, 208 F. 2d 424.

The question here

is whether an unexpected stop made when another vehicle
is obvsiously too close to the rear end of the forward
vehicle constitutes negligence per se.
It was held in Greyhound Cab, Inc. v. Sewell,
190 A. 814

(1937) that the ignorance of the defendant's

driver of the presence of another vehicle behind his cab
which was brought to a sudden stop without any warning
or signal does not absolve driver of negligence since due
care would require. that he assure himself of the abscence
of any other vehicle.
In Crow v. Alesi, 55 So. 2d 16 (1951) the Court
said that the rule requiring the driver of a following
vehicle to keep his car in such control so as to be able
to avoid a collision with the vehicle ahead is not to
relieve the driver of the leading car of the obligation
to drive carefully to avoid sudden and unexpected stops.
Where the plaintiff was injured when the
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defendant's truck collided with the rear end of his
stopped car, and there was evidence for the defendant
that he was closely following the car, that there was
no signal given of any intention to stop, and that the
stop was made so abruptly in front of him as to render
collision inescapeable, the plaintiff testifying that
the stopping was made gradually and had been probably
signaled, it was held in Heck v. Henne, 213 NW 112 (1927)
that the verdict for the defendant was justified.

This

was at a time that contributory negligence barred any
recovery by the plaintiff.
Hardin v. Sutherland, 289 P. 900

(1930) rejected

plaintiff's contention that her driver had no duty to
keep a lookout for the safety of traffic in the rear.
It is undisputed that the Respondent was aware
of the presence of the Appellant's vehicle behind him
and it is undisputed that the Respondent knew the
Appellant's vehicle was too close for safety and yet
inspite of this, the Respondent stopped in the middle
of the road.

Presumably, the only warning given to

the Appellant would have been the Respondent's brake
lights.

It is submitted that State law and case law

require greater precaution on the part of the driver
of the front vehicle under circumstances such as these.
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The violation of a statute regarding stopping and
turning in safety has been held to be negligent per
se.

See Stearman v. Miranda, 396 P. 2d 622 (1964)

and Olson v. Sutherland, 355 P. 2d 774 (1960).
Appellant is not trying to urge upon this
court that he was not negligent.

He does urge,

however, that the Respondent was also negligent.
CONCLUSION
Respondent's awareness of the presence and
closeness of Appellant's vehicle and Respondent's
sudden and unexpected stop constitutes negligence
per se.
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